# Pastebin CoZ3mndR
SpaceX did not develop a software development plan, a software configuration management plan, or a software quality control plan for any Ground Support Equipment (GSE) software located at the McGregor, Texas, test facility.
 • SpaceX failed to comply with AS9100C, section 7.1.3, which requires it to “establish, implement, and maintain a configuration management process.”
 • SpaceX failed to comply with AS9100C, section 7.3.4, which requires that “systematic reviews of design and development shall be performed in accordance with planned arrangements.” We found that SpaceX critical design review (CDR) records lacked engineering authorizations and approvals. A CDR is the final engineering review before production begins. Although the launch vehicle was in production, SpaceX could not provide evidence of engineering approval for the CDRs of the Merlin 1D vacuum engine and vacuum nozzle extension. We also found that the CDR for the “oxygen/nitrox relief panel” was approved on the contingency that CDR action items be resolved in parallel with the proceeding development. However, SpaceX could not provide evidence that it tracked or resolved these CDR action items. The lack of approval for CDRs increases the risk that an unapproved Falcon 9 design progresses into the production phase, and will ultimately lead to costly rework of the Falcon 9, or reduced Falcon 9 mission performance.
 • We found that SpaceX purchased equipment calibration services from a supplier that was not on the SpaceX approved supplier list.
 • SpaceX failed to comply with AS9100C, section 7.5.1.2, which requires it to “control and document changes affecting processes, production equipment, tools, or software programs.” We observed SpaceX technicians performing leak check steps on a Merlin engine turbo pump that were not in the work instructions. Leak checks ensure there is no fluid leaking from any part of the system, but should be accomplished exactly as written in a work instruction. We also observed SpaceX technicians using tools and GSE with part numbers that were different from those specified in the work instructions. The technicians explained that the work instructions had not been updated to include the most recent requirements. SpaceX’s failure to update work instructions caused the technicians to deviate from approved procedures. This could result in leak checks that do not accomplish the intent of the tests or leak checks that may damage flight systems. All work instructions should be up to date with engineering approval to reflect current practices.
 • At SpaceX, we found an inadequately protected Merlin engine on the test stand. The Merlin engine exhaust ports and vent tubes should have been protected with specific protective covers. However, we found several ventilation ports either unprotected or covered with strips of metallic tape. Furthermore, we found bottles of soda and personal items in FOD-controlled areas. We also found inaccurate tool control logs and toolboxes with undocumented and broken tools, and toolboxes missing required tools.
 • In the SpaceX tubing production area, we observed SpaceX technicians performing a machining operation on a tube without inspecting the tube for FOD prior to installing it on flight hardware.
 • We found that during tool calibration procedures, SpaceX technicians did not take into account environmental temperature of the calibration lab nor did they document temperature effects on the calibration results of measurement and test equipment. Accounting for temperature effects during calibration procedures is critical, because precision tools and fixtures change dimensions with temperature change. In addition, SpaceX did not specify calibration intervals for production tooling and fixtures that were used to verify that EELV products meet engineering requirements. Production tools and test equipment require calibration at appropriate intervals to ensure the accuracy of their measurements. We also found that SpaceX did not always record calibration measurements and data generated during the calibration of inspection and test equipment. Recording calibration data is important to determine proper calibration intervals and to ensure that the previous measurements of the tool and test equipment were still within tolerance. If the calibration of the tool and test equipment is out of specification, then an audit must be conducted to determine which EELV component the tools or test equipment were used on. The EELV component would then need to be inspected or tested to ensure the out-of-calibration tools or test equipment did not damage the launch vehicle. Furthermore, we identified 352 tools, measurement and test equipment items, with expired calibrations at the SpaceX McGregor facility. Although the calibration was expired and the calibration lab recalled the equipment, the equipment had not been returned to the lab and therefore may have been available for use on EELV systems.
 • We found the borescope inspection criteria for product acceptance of the Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel (COPV) liner was not well defined regarding defect characteristics. The inspection procedure was outdated due to a change in the process, and contained photographs that were unusable for their intended purpose of determining defect size. This lack of clear product acceptance criteria resulted in more than 100 COPV units being identified as nonconforming and pending disposition.